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In 2010, the United States experienced the worst environmental disaster in its history. An explosion on a BP oilrig
located in the Gulf of Mexico triggered the crisis. As a result, the United States coast guard and BP were charged
with crisis communication in its response to the crisis. This essay provides an unprecedented examination and
analysis of the communication experiences of public information officers who worked in the unified command
center in Houma, Louisiana during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. The authors use the discourse of
renewal theory to understand the communication practices and choices of the public information officers. Then,
using the renewal framework, the authors present three implications for improving crisis communication
research and practice.

1. Introduction
On April 20, 2010, at approximately 10:00 PM CDT, the semi
submersible oilrig Deepwater Horizon exploded and caught fire
(Transocean Ltd, 2010). Because of the explosion, 11 people died, and
oil began spilling into the Gulf of Mexico. This event created a crisis and
global media attention for the lease operator, BP Exploration & Pro
duction (BP). The incident demanded crisis communication from BP
about how they were going to coordinate, manage, and communicate
during the environmental disaster. The crisis communication during this
event is unique because it was a joint effort between the United States
Coast Guard, who was in charge of the cleanup and recovery and BP,
who was responsible for the environmental disaster. In other response
locations, the efforts of BP and the Coast Guard were divided into
separate areas and coordination was minimized. Central to the crisis
response were Public Information Officers (PIOs) who managed the
crisis communication day to day.
This essay examines the crisis communication of PIOs working on the
response in the Gulf of Mexico. PIOs worked in Joint Information Cen
ters (JIC) in Miami, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; Houma, Louisiana; and
Houston, Texas. We use focused interviews in this study to learn from
the PIOs who worked throughout the crisis in Houma, Louisiana. Ulti
mately, we seek to understand the experiences, choices, and

communication approaches of the PIOs during the oil spill response and
recovery efforts.
This study is valuable for three key reasons: First, it provides a rare
opportunity to learn from practitioners who communicated during the
largest environmental disaster in United States history (Baker, 2010,
para. 2). Second, this study helps provide an unprecedented, insider
view of the coordinated response and crisis communication decision
making between the United States government and BP. Finally, this
essay serves as an opportunity to understand how crisis communication
theory and practice function during large-scale disasters.
In this paper, we describe the context of the oil spill and how PIOs fit
into the structure of the response. Next, we provide an overview of crisis
communication theory. Then, we explain how we collected data from
the PIOs. Further, we offer the results of the PIO experiences and next
engage in a discussion of these experiences in light of the crisis
communication literature. Last, we provide three practical implications
based on the findings and analysis.
2. Crisis in the Gulf of Mexico
2.1. Structure of the coordinated response
To respond to the crisis, the U.S. Coast Guard formed a partnership
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with BP, the responsible party (UPDATE 7, 2010). The Coast Guard was
the regulatory authority for the response to the crisis. The Coast Guard
and BP were supported by fifteen other agencies including the Depart
ment of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, and the Envi
ronmental Protection Agency, among others (RestoreTheGulf, 2010).
The entire response was managed by a Unified Area Command (UAC)
led by Admiral Thad Allen. The UAC was divided into four sectors and
each sector was managed by a Unified Command (UC).
The UAC system provided a well-defined hierarchy for the response.
Each of the four UCs reported to UAC in New Orleans. In Houma, the
incident commanders were supported by an administrative advisory
staff that consisted of a Joint Information Center (JIC), a community
liaison office, security personnel, a legal team, and representatives from
the various federal and state agencies taking part in the response. The
hierarchy then branched into four major departments: Operations,
Planning, Logistics, and Finance. Each branch reported to the incident
commanders, who in turn reported to UAC.
Each UC had a JIC. The JIC was the central hub for all incoming and
outgoing messages during the crisis response. PIOs played an important
role in leading the JIC, setting communication priorities, and commu
nicating with stakeholders during the crisis. In the JIC there was a head
PIO from the Coast Guard, and a head PIO from BP. They worked
together in the JIC throughout the response, though the BP PIO was
subordinate to the Coast Guard PIO. In situations of disagreement about
procedures or plans, the BP PIO would defer to the Coast Guard PIO.
Within the JIC there were also a large number of individuals with
expertise in the area of public relations and public affairs. Some of these
communication experts were employed by the Coast Guard or BP, while
others were brought in as contractors and consultants to assist in
determining best practices for communication. These individuals sup
ported the PIOs throughout the response.

profits, and residents; coordinate release alerts and warnings; plan and
carry out evacuations; and develop and implement public education
programs” (Littlefield et al., 2012, p. 246). While the duties of a PIO and
an emergency manager often overlap, in this case the PIOs were not
emergency managers. The PIOs in this case were Coast Guard officers
and BP employees, and in this response neither set of PIOs acted in the
capacity of emergency managers. The PIOs shared the communication
responsibilities that emergency managers typically have, but did not
carry any of the operational responsibilities that are typical for emer
gency managers (for example, none of the PIOs engaged in threat
analysis, evacuation planning, or management of specific logistical is
sues related to the cleanup efforts). The PIOs were engaged almost
exclusively on an array of communication functions, from coordinating
with the media to engaging with local leaders to address questions and
concerns.
2.3. The global response
When reflecting on the nature of BP’s response, globally, to the
Deepwater Horizon spill, few would make the argument that the
communication efforts surrounding the spill were successful. In the early
days of the spill, BP was not accurate about the magnitude of the event
(BBC, 2010). Later, there were a series of gaffes that left the public
wondering whether BP’s leadership took the spill seriously. For
example, in May, one month into the spill and following an (unsuc
cessful) attempt to seal the breach, BP sent an insensitive tweet appar
ently aimed at injecting levity into the situation (Lubin, 2010a, May 27).
A few days later, then CEO of BP Tony Hayward famously said,
regarding the spill and its disruptive nature on the lives of those affected,
“There’s no one who wants this over more than I do. I’d like my life
back” (Lubin, 2010b, June 2, para. 1, emphasis added). He apologized
the next day via Facebook, though the apology is not what people
remember today.
Beyond this series of unfortunate events, BP also received criticism
for its use of paid media to begin telling its own version of the oil spill
cleanup story (Cheney, 2010). BP ran a series of advertisements and
sponsored posts on social media platforms explaining how clean and
ready-for-tourists much of the Gulf still was. This was a departure from
the type of messaging that occurred in previous oil spill cleanups –
messaging that typically came only from official PIO channels and did
not include promotional messaging (Cheney, 2010). While BP defended
its right to tell its side of the story and highlight successes, this move left
questions about the motivations and commitments the corporation was
demonstrating.
The efforts BP took to improve its image during the spill response
were not only criticized by commentators in the media – they were
negatively assessed by scholars in the communication, management,
and environmental disciplines. Kassinis and Panayiotou (2018) argue
that BP used greenwashing to distract from the enormity of the disaster
and its culpability and responsibility in the cleanup efforts. They argue
that by using compelling visuals on their website and other digital media
platforms, “the company aided in the formation of a new reality in the
face of gross disaster” (Kassinis & Panayiotou, 2018, p. 41), and that
these efforts contributed to BP’s restoration of its corporate image.
Beyond the arguments of greenwashing, other scholars have been
similarly critical of BP’s communication efforts. For example, Smithson
and Venette (2013) critically examined BP’s congressional testimonies
and found evidence of unethical stonewalling and attempts at minimi
zation of the severity of the disaster. In a similar vein, Valvi and Fragkos
(2013) highlight multiple failures in BP’s communication at a national
and international level.
Up to this point, studies have been rightly critical of the global
communication work of BP, particularly those efforts that occurred on
the national and international scale. However, what has not been
carefully considered by research to this point – in part because the data
were simply not available – is the communication efforts of PIOs and

2.2. The role of PIO
PIOs are communication coordinators. The position is commonplace
in a wide variety of organizations including hospitals and police forces,
as well as local, state, and federal agencies. These individuals are typi
cally expected to be “spokespersons, or… advisers,” and they “perform
media and public relations duties” (Mitzel, 2010, para. 1). PIOs may be
expected to coordinate communication among various agencies, across
multiple contexts, and for many different groups (ESPIOC, 2007; FCPIO,
2007; Reynolds, Galdo, & Sokler, 2002). Additionally, PIOs are expected
to manage communication with stakeholders, including the public,
during crisis situations. Both the Coast Guard and BP employed PIOs
throughout the response. These practitioners managed media relations
from around the world, provided crisis communication to different
stakeholders, and coordinated communication for the JIC.
PIOs also have internal communication responsibilities. They coor
dinate communication throughout the command hierarchy during a
crisis response. Crisis responses are often formulated through an Inci
dent Command System (ICS) framework. The ICS framework:
is the systematic tool used for the command, control, and coordi
nation of an emergency response. ICS allows agencies to work
together using common terminology and operating procedures for
controlling personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications at
a single incident scene (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2006,
para. 2).
The purpose of ICS is to allow responders from myriad agencies and
organizations to form a coordinated crisis response. ICS is drilled by
federal, state, and local agencies so that responders will have a common
approach to managing a crisis (OSHA, n.d.).
Importantly, PIOs are sometimes also emergency managers. Emer
gency managers “gather information to analyze threats; share informa
tion; collaborate with all layers of government, businesses, schools, non2
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illustrates how many organizations respond to crises. These responses
often involve denials of responsibility, minimization of the crisis, and
shifting the blame away from the crisis-stricken organization. As Xu
(2018) points out, “preoccupation over organizational image and
reputation can backfire following a crisis because it gives an impression
that the organization cares more about its self-interests than the
well-being of the people” (p. 109).
A contrasting approach in crisis communication theory and research
is characterized by theories that emphasize the importance of open,
honest communication and developing strong stakeholder relationships
(1997, Botan, 1993; Olaniran & Williams, 2001; Olaniran, Scholl, Wil
liams, & Boyer, 2012; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2019). While each of
these perspectives has merits, we selected the discourse of renewal
(Ulmer et al., 2019) to understand the PIOs’ communication experiences
during the crisis. The discourse of renewal is a normative crisis
communication theory that seeks to address the public’s need for in
formation about a crisis, learning from the event, and producing crisis
communication that meets high standards of communication ethics (Xu,
2018). This paper examines the crisis communication choices BP and
Coast Guard PIOs made during the environmental disaster. The goal of
the PIOs during the crisis was to coordinate and distribute information
internally, within the JIC and UC, and externally to various publics. For
this reason, we felt the discourse of renewal theory was best suited to
guide our interview questions, research questions, and to focus our re
sults. The discourse of renewal seeks to better understand the choices
that crisis communicators make and the actual communication they
produce (see, for example, Sellnow, Iverson, & Sellnow, 2017; & Veil,
Sellnow, & Heald, 2011). It also considers both internal and external
communication choices and functions of crisis communication. What
follows is a description of the four characteristics of discourse of renewal
theory along with the research questions that directed our study.
Much research suggests that learning is vital to effective crisis
management (Elliot, Smith, & McGuinness, 2000; Kovoor-Misra &
Nathan, 2000; Mittelstaedt, 2005). The discourse of renewal divides
organizational learning into four aspects: vicarious learning, organiza
tional memory, learning from failure, and unlearning (Pyle, Fuller, &
Ulmer, 2020). Pre-crisis, vicarious learning takes place through simu
lations, videos, training, or examinations of case studies. Vicarious
learning is important, because “organizations can avoid crises by
learning from other organizations’ failures and crises” (Ulmer, Sellnow,
& Seeger, 2019). The second learning type, organizational memory, is
“an accumulation of knowledge based on the observation of successes
and failures” by organizational members (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger,
2019, p. 178). Organizational memory is vital for organizational suc
cess. The third type of learning, learning from failure, is a natural pro
cess in which an organization is able to observe its own mistakes and
adjust for the future. The fourth area, unlearning, is the willingness of an
organization to forego outdated practices. It is often challenging for
organizations to unlearn, but unlearning is a valuable and often neces
sary aspect for overcoming a crisis. Prior studies focus on communica
tion of learning rather than the self-report processes of learning by a
communication team or organization. To better understand how
learning affected the PIOs’ crisis communication, the following research
question is posed:
RQ 1: In what ways is organizational learning evident or absent in
the reported communication experiences of PIOs in Houma, Louisiana,
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
Next, ethical communication consists of instituting strong positive
organizational values, developing stakeholder relationships, and
providing significant choice for stakeholders in crisis communication.
Each aspect of ethical communication is crucial to an effective crisis
response. First, organizations should determine appropriate values to
guide their crisis response. For instance, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention use the values of “be first, be right, and be credible” to
guide their crisis communication (Reynolds et al., 2002, p. 95). Second,
organizations must also develop strong, healthy, and equitable

communication specialists at the local and regional level. The purpose of
the current study is to shed new light on communication and public
engagement efforts which occurred at the local and regional level at the
UC in Houma, Louisiana. The current study will shed light on the
communication efforts that have gone unnoticed up to this point,
providing additional context for what has been a nearly universal onesided exploration of how poorly BP communicated during the 2010
response.
2.4. The response in Houma
As oil continued to vent into the Gulf, BP and the United States
Government had a responsibility to communicate with stakeholders
about the response and recovery operations. Engaging in crisis
communication was instrumental to UAC’s response and recovery ef
forts. PIOs working for each UC played a key role in providing the public
and other stakeholders with the information they needed to maintain
response operations. For instance, PIOs coordinated information ses
sions for the public, addressed media requests, and answered questions
about response and recovery operations. Additionally, the JIC coordi
nated with local stakeholders to communicate about the value and risks
associated with using dispersants, controlled burning, containment
boom, and skimming. These efforts were designed to help stakeholders
understand the purpose of the ongoing cleanup approaches.
For the individuals working in the JIC, life during the response was
hectic and the work seemed unending. They worked under intense
media scrutiny, with 24-h coverage of the event for the duration of the
response. JIC members often went without sleep, working well past the
end of the designated 12-h shift each day. They worked in a conference
room filled with people, working long hours to answer calls, gather in
formation, and distribute updates to those who needed the information.
During press conferences, PIOs and other spokespersons became the
target of verbal assault by members of the media and local leaders. Local
leaders were understandably upset about the uncertainty of the response
and its timeline. The stories of the interviewees paint a picture of a
response center filled with individuals working to ensure a speedy re
covery, and to meet the needs of local populations.
To understand what the current research suggests about crisis
communication, the following section is an examination of relevant
literature to identify and frame relevant research questions for this
study.
3. Crisis communication theory
An organizational crisis is characterized “as a specific, unexpected,
and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of un
certainty and simultaneously present an organization with both oppor
tunities for and threats to its high priority goals” (Ulmer, Sellnow, &
Seeger, 2019, p. 7). Theories and research in crisis communication tend
to fall into one of a couple of major philosophies or perspectives. One
approach is built on a foundation of theory and research that emphasizes
the critical nature of an organization’s image or reputation in crisis
communication (Benoit, 1997; Coombs & Halladay, 2002; Hearit,
2006). For instance, the image repair literature explains how post-crisis
communication strategies can be used to repair the image of an orga
nization following a crisis (Benoit, 1997). The apologia literature ex
amines how organizations can and should apologize for transgressions
or attacks that result in crisis and negatively impact an organization’s
image (Hearit, 2006). Situational crisis communication theory “evalu
ates the reputational threat posed by the crisis situation and then rec
ommends crisis response strategies based upon the reputational threat
level” (Coombs, 2012, p. 138). In each case, these theories provide
communication strategies and guidance for repairing the image or
reputation of the organization in the aftermath of a crisis. This research
has a rich and long-standing tradition within the field of crisis
communication. This research tradition is important because it
3
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relationships with crisis stakeholders. These relationships should be
characterized by honest and open dialogue about the crisis response and
recovery operations (Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). Significant
choice, the final component of ethical communication, is essential to
managing any post crisis communication effectively (Ulmer & Sellnow,
1997). Significant choice is grounded upon the idea that crisis messages
are “based on all the information available when the decision must be
made… [and] includes knowledge of the alternatives and the possible
long- and short-term consequences of each” (Nilsen, 1974, p. 45). Sig
nificant choice involves providing crisis information in an honest and
complete manner. This approach enables stakeholders to make rational
decisions about the crisis, including how to protect themselves. Few
studies examine the internal processes of developing these external
messages. As such, the second research question is posed to examine
how the PIOs addressed ethical crisis communication during the
response and recovery operations after the oil spill:
RQ 2: What standards of ethical communication are evident or ab
sent in the reported communication experiences of PIOs in Houma,
Louisiana, during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
Third, effective internal and external organizational rhetoric em
phasizes framing, “structur[ing] a particular reality,” and coordinating
information effectively for organizational stakeholders, including the
public (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2009, p. 308). For instance, inter
nally, organizations need to ensure a free flow of information by coor
dinating and sharing information and ideas effectively. Externally,
organizations need to enact positive values, share information, collab
orate with stakeholders, and structure a new normal for external crisis
stakeholders. Effective external organizational rhetoric often involves
inspiring stakeholders, building consensus, and establishing a commit
ment to overcoming the crisis (Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005).
Few studies examine the self-report successes and failures of crisis
communicators following an event. To consider the effectiveness of the
internal and external organizational rhetoric by the PIOs during the
crisis the following research question is posed:
RQ 3: What examples of organizational rhetoric are reported in the
communication experiences of PIOs in Houma, Louisiana, during the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
The final objective, prospective vision, involves crisis communica
tors maintaining optimism, being proactive, and focusing on the future
(Ulmer et al., 2009). Essential to a prospective vision is being proactive.
Organizations that have not engaged in pre-crisis planning are less likely
to be able to handle the media and stakeholder scrutiny following a
crisis. As a result, being reactive to a crisis typically involves the media
and stakeholders setting the agenda for the crisis response. Conversely, a
prospective vision involves a clear vision of how the organization wants
to communicate and resolve the crisis. Few studies examine self-report
discussions by participants about their communication choices. To see
if and how the PIOs managed the important standard of maintaining a
prospective vision, the following research question is posed:
RQ 4: What examples of prospective vision are evident or absent in
the reported communication experiences of PIOs in Houma, Louisiana,
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
This section provided an overview of crisis communication theory,
with a greater focus on the discourse of renewal. We explained why we
selected the discourse of renewal, and then briefly defined each of the
four components of the theoretical framework. We also delineated the
four research questions for our study. The following section provides an
explanation of our data collection and analysis.

deliberate, as we focused on individuals acting as communication
leaders who managed all of the messages in Houma, LA throughout the
crisis (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). We were able to interview every PIO
who worked a minimum of two weeks in the JIC. All of the PIOs we
interviewed were involved in the response for a minimum of three
weeks, and represent the leadership for the JIC during the entire crisis
response. Our sample was exhaustive in that it represents the entire
response timeline. To clarify this point, our interview participants,
collectively, were present when the incident command post stood up in
Houma, Louisiana in late April, were present throughout the entire
response, and only transitioned away from Houma as the command post
was standing down in mid-September. There is no part of the crisis
response that our interview participants were not present at the JIC. The
only PIOs we did not interview were those who were stationed in the JIC
in Houma for less than one week, and whose experiences were therefore
too limited to answer all the interview questions. Our total sample was
(n = 7) PIOs. While this is a small sample, it represents perspectives from
both BP and the Coast Guard that spans the entirety of the response
effort.
Our sample provides an important opportunity to learn from the
communication experiences of a specific type of individual in a unique
and specific setting (Sengupta, 1996). The Deepwater Horizon crisis is
currently the largest environmental disaster in United States history and
the extended timeframe of the crisis makes the interview data from the
PIOs involved both novel and valuable for learning and managing future
crises of this nature. While there have been prior studies focused on the
Deepwater Horizon crisis, other communication research about the
response to this spill has been external and evaluative in nature (see for
example Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011; Muralidharan, Dillistone, &
Shin, 2011). This study breaks from previous work by offering firsthand
perspectives of the PIOs, the communication specialists who worked
day-to-day in the midst of the crisis response.
4.2. Procedures
We conducted focused interviews with the PIOs in order to under
stand their communication experiences while they were working in the
JIC. The questions were developed from the discourse of renewal liter
ature. Interviews were conducted on-site in Houma, LA, as well as by
telephone. In total, we interviewed seven PIOs that either worked for the
Coast Guard or BP and oversaw the JIC throughout the Deepwater Ho
rizon crisis. An Institutional Review Board at our institution approved
this project and each interviewee signed a consent form confirming their
willingness to participate in our research. Each interviewee was assured
total anonymity in the reporting of our data. To maintain anonymity in
reporting, we have provided a pseudonym for each participant.
4.3. Interviews
The questions we asked dealt with the process of operating the JIC,
communication strategies, how the regulatory authority (the Coast
Guard) and the responsible party (BP) coordinated their work in the JIC,
and how members of the JIC interacted with the media. We examined
how the PIOs described their internal and external organizational
communication processes. There was a total of 11 questions used for the
interviews that were generated from the literature on the discourse of
renewal, as well as best practices in crisis communication that are
consistent with the discourse of renewal (Reynolds et al., 2002; Seeger,
2006). Each interview lasted between 45 and 60 min. We recorded and
transcribed each interview. Data were collected from September 8,
2010, until December 6, 2010. Note: Publication of this research was
delayed by the request of our interview participants, who sought to have
both time and distance between themselves and the event before our
data became public.

4. Method
4.1. Sampling
This project provided an unprecedented opportunity to conduct
qualitative interviews with PIOs from the Coast Guard and BP that led
the JIC in Houma, LA during the 2010 oil spill. Our sample was
4
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4.4. Interview analysis

different ideas on how to do things than we did…There were two
PIOs, and I’ve never been in a system before where there were two
PIOs in one JIC. It did cause some conflict– especially when you had
someone like me coming in who was at least 10 years younger than
the other PIO, but had more experience and was well-known in the
region… But most of the core disagreements in the JIC were because
people were burnt out, people were tired… and I never disagreed
with the other PIO in the JIC, the two PIOs would go off and talk on
our own. We needed to present a unified front to everyone in the JIC.
(Terry, Coast Guard)

We used the discourse of renewal as a structure for developing RQs,
as well as for presenting our findings from the analysis. We conducted a
“‘theoretical’ thematic analysis” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 10) in which
our exploration of the data was driven by our interest in answering
questions specifically about whether and how PIOs conducted them
selves per the guidance of the discourse of renewal. We selected the
discourse of renewal because the PIOs’ charge was not to manage the
image or reputation of BP, but rather to coordinate and provide infor
mation to stakeholders. In short, the goal of this study was to use the
discourse of renewal as a lens through which to better understand the
communication practices of the PIOs.
We conducted a thematic analysis of the interview questions and
organized the data according to the research questions delineated at the
outset of the essay (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Downs & Adrian, 2004;
Norton, Sias, & Brown, 2011). We attributed renewal-related codes to
each section of transcribed data, either when reported communication
behaviors were in line with the theory or when behaviors were in con
flict with the recommendations of the theory. The analysis began with
note-taking during the interviews, at which time we began noticing
patterns across participant answers. We then transcribed the interviews
by hand in order to further familiarize ourselves with the data. The
process of interview and transcription was phase 1 of the analysis (Braun
& Clarke, 2006). Over several rounds of review and analysis, we
developed clusters of themes and sub-themes based on the guiding
framework of the renewal theory. This comprised phase 2 of the analysis
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).
Data management was conducted manually, using hand-written
notes on printed pages as well as post-it notes and comments in sup
plementary electronic data files (Saldaña, 2015). We read through the
transcriptions multiple times so that we could find consistent and
divergent answers (Pettigrew, Miller-Day, Krieger, & Hecht, 2011).
Through this process we were able to take specific stories and examples
from participants and interpret them via the lens of the discourse of
renewal. We then organized the data into themes and sub-themes, and
reviewed them for consistency and accuracy which Braun and Clarke
(2006) identify as phases 3 and 4 of the analysis process. Despite the
small sample size, we saw saturation in our responses and had confi
dence in both the quality and depth of our interview data following the
seventh interview (Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora, 2016). Lastly, we
named the themes and reported our analysis, phases 5 and 6 of the
analysis (per Braun & Clarke, 2006). Consistent with a
theoretically-driven thematic analysis, we have structured the analysis
based on the framework of the discourse of renewal. We outline the
themes and sub-themes in the Key Results section below.

As is explicated later in the discussion, the Coast Guard PIOs’
communication efforts were driven by the Coast Guard axiom,
“Maximum disclosure, minimum delay.” Many of the BP PIOs indicated
that this same axiom became a guiding value and philosophy for the
entire JIC response team.
Secondly, there were many difficulties related to the scale of the
response. For example, one problem that was often repeated was the
challenge created by various elected officials “pushing their own
agendas.” Another similar issue was the rampant rumors about the spill
or the cleanup efforts, such as “a river of toxic oil just below the sur
face… that didn’t actually exist,” (William, BP) or “boats secretly
spraying the coastline with chemicals at night” (Pat, BP). Another major
concern related to the scale of the response was the size of the command
chain, with potential communication failure at the local “frontline”
level, the county or parish level, the regional command level, or at UAC
in New Orleans. These challenges were a function of the scope of the
disaster and the ongoing response efforts. Each PIO who had been
involved in prior disaster responses, which included a variety of oil and
chemical spills in the preceding two decades, reported that this response
made each of their previous response experiences seem small, if not
trivial. It would be difficult to overstate the impact the scale of the
response had on the communication efforts and decisions of PIOs acting
both for the Coast Guard and for BP.
Beyond the two meta-themes, there were seven clear themes that
developed during the analysis. The following section is divided into four
sections, one for each RQ. We restate each RQ and indicate the themes
that address that RQ. Since the interview questions closely followed the
characteristics of the discourse of renewal we were able to assess the
relationship between the PIOs’ actual communication practices and the
normative dimensions of the discourse of renewal. Each research ques
tion contained more than one theme. What follows is a presentation of
the results of our findings, beginning with RQ1.
5.1. Organizational learning
RQ 1: In what ways is organizational learning evident or absent in the
reported communication experiences of PIOs in Houma, Louisiana,
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
There were two major themes that arose which helped answer this
question. First, there were a number of pre-crisis mistakes or oversights
that led to difficulties during the response. In addition to the need for a
crisis communication plan, most of the PIOs indicated that they had very
little formal communication training. Instead, most relied on “extensive
experience in the field” (this quote from William, BP, captures the
sentiment of several PIOs), though more than one indicated having
“extensive public relations and public affairs training,” having “work
[ed] in the public relations field for more than 20 years” (Raphael, BP –
again captures the sentiment of multiple interview participants). This
theme is situated in the larger category of organizational learning
because of the need to unlearn ineffective practices, as well as the
learning from failure that took place among the PIOs.
The second theme that developed was the PIOs’ expressed need to
take better care of themselves and their teams. Every PIO who was
interviewed indicated that they were working longer than the expected
12-h shift, often as much as 16− 18 h days without taking time off. One

5. Key results
Before exploring the specific themes that arose in the analysis of
data, it is important to acknowledge two meta-themes that developed
through the analysis. These are themes that arose clearly through the
reported data of all participants, but that do not fit within the discourse
of renewal categorization of the other themes. The first is about the
nature of the response in Houma. The Coast Guard PIOs have a very
different set of responsibilities and constraints from the BP PIOs (see, e.
g., Kim & Liu, 2012; Liu, Horsley, & Levenshus, 2010). However,
because of the nature of the response and the decision to keep BP and the
Coast Guard PIOs together in a single JIC, BP was beholden to the same
high standard of communication to which the Coast Guard is held. One
of the Coast Guard PIOs explained the nature of the relationship between
BP and the Coast Guard in this way:
There were core differences between the ways we would handle
something and they would handle something… BP is run like a
business, we were run like a government. So BP oftentimes had
5
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PIO recalled “one night I had to leave early, around 9:00, to go to the
mall so I could buy new clothes. I just didn’t have time to wash any
thing” (Vernon, BP). This participant went on to describe his constant
need to be connected to what was happening in the JIC:

by, “but here is what we do know” (Raphael, BP).
5.3. Effective organizational rhetoric
RQ 3: What examples of organizational rhetoric are reported in the
communication experiences of PIOs in Houma, Louisiana, during the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
Two themes developed in response to RQ3. First, the PIOs indicated
that they were able to foster a “one-team mentality” by remaining uni
fied in one JIC, rather than splitting into two separate JICs (as happened
at other response locations). One PIO indicated that, although the situ
ation was often frustrating, “internal politics didn’t come through as
much” as they may have at other locations (Terry, Coast Guard). The
PIOs also emphasized that the regulatory authority always demon
strated regard for the responsible party. They explained that the Coast
Guard PIO, who was the JIC manager, and the BP head PIO “discussed
disagreements in private.” For example, at one point a BP PIO “started
trying to give some orders to [Coast Guard personnel], so I had to pull
him aside and make sure he understood the chain of command and that
he couldn’t give orders to my people” (Sam, Coast Guard). They also
referred to the working relationship within the JIC as “close, collegial,
professional, and actually kind of fun,” as well as “open and honest” and
“productive” (Vernon, BP). They emphasized that not everything
worked well, and there were people who “certainly did not get along”
(Pat, BP), but that “at the end of the day, we’re all on the same team
working for the same goals” (Sam, Coast Guard). One PIO went so far as
to describe the relationship as “the joy of doing battle, meeting a chal
lenge together, and fighting to reach a deadline” (William, BP). These
points were emphasized in various ways by PIOs from both
organizations.
The second theme that arose was difficulty and frustration regarding
communication within UAC. The PIOs indicated that their updates,
messages, and requests to UAC in New Orleans tended to go unan
swered. They reached a point where, in their morning meetings, they
would refer to UAC as the “Black Hole,” because “nothing we sent out
would ever come back” (William, BP).

When I got my first break I was like, “I want to see my wife,” but as
soon as I got on the plane and didn’t have my Blackberry and didn’t
know what was going on I was almost in a panic. When I landed in
[State], and not being there and not being able to manage, to relax…
It wasn’t that I didn’t trust people, but you start to feel that you’re so
integral to what is happening that it’s hard to remove yourself. I
would be more conscious of that. There was no reason to work a 33-h
shift.
This theme is also tied to learning from failure and the need to un
learn ineffective practices.
5.2. Ethical communication
RQ 2: What standards of ethical communication are evident and
absent in the reported communication experiences of PIOs in Houma,
Louisiana, during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
In response to RQ2, there were two major themes that developed.
First was the importance of meeting stakeholder needs. PIOs indicated
that an important part of meeting stakeholder needs and building re
lationships was to bring local leaders into the UC and the JIC to see what
the responders were doing on a daily basis. Tied to this was a shift early
on in the response in the way that the PIOs connected with the public. At
first, the PIOs attempted to host “New England style town hall meet
ings,” which unfortunately tended to devolve into “government bashing
parties, BP bashing parties, whoever was closest” (Terry, Coast Guard).
To address the problems of this type of meeting, they began using an
“information expo” type meeting in which “people were able to sit down
and have their questions answered.” These meetings allowed the PIOs to
“sit down with people in small groups or one-on-one,” and although “it
took them a while” to understand the value of bringing local leaders into
the command center, “once we did it was awesome” (Kelly, BP). The
PIOs also helped facilitate communication with stakeholders by drawing
on the knowledge of subject matter experts (SMEs) and workers on the
front lines of the response. As one PIO explained it:

5.4. Prospective vision
RQ 4: What examples of prospective vision are evident and absent in
the reported communication experiences of PIOs in Houma, Louisiana,
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response?
One major theme arose in relation to RQ4, which was the PIOs were
reactive, yet were able to not fall behind in their communication. The
PIOs each indicated that there was “no formal crisis communication plan
in place” when the response began. This led to a situation in which
“60–80 % of the time was spent being reactive,” and maintaining a
proactive communication stance became quite difficult (Kelly, BP). Not
only was there no solid strategic communication plan in place when they
arrived, but each PIO indicated they helped to build a plan while they
were in charge of the JIC. At the communication level, when one is
trapped in a stance of reactivity, it is difficult to focus on building or
maintaining prospective vision. Despite the reactive nature of their
communication, there were a number of attempts at proactive
communication. For example, one PIO indicated that although they did
not have a written and solidly defined communication plan, they had an
unofficial plan that consisted of three parts (Raphael, BP):

At the end of the day I’m just a talking head. I’m not the person
leading the operations or running the operations or cleaning up the
shore or driving a ship. And if you really want to give media the real
access then the best way to do that is by giving them access to the
folks who really know what’s going on, whether that’s scientists or
the guy picking up tar balls on the beach. (Kelly, BP)
This statement was an example used to emphasize PIO commitment
to connecting local leaders and members of the media with the in
dividuals best equipped to answer specific questions. They indicated
that drawing on the knowledge and experience of SMEs helped to
establish credibility, which was important in establishing relationships
with stakeholders.
The second theme that developed was the importance of minimizing
speculation. Several of the PIOs reported working under the Coast Guard
axiom of “maximum disclosure, minimum delay,” and stated that the
three elements of an effective crisis response are “honesty, integrity, and
timeliness.” The Coast Guard PIOs influenced the views of the BP PIOs in
this area, as the BP PIOs reported adopting these Coast Guard tenets as
central to their own view of how best to proceed over the course of the
response. They indicated the importance of “avoiding speculation and
conjecture, but only relaying the information that was on hand” (Sam,
Coast Guard). As part of this stance, the PIOs indicated that sometimes
the only appropriate answer is “I don’t know.” Rather than stopping
here, they indicated that an appropriate response in that situation is “I
don’t know, but I’ll try to find out,” or that “I don’t know” was followed

1 For the communication effort to seek to accurately and transparently
convey to and through the media and other stakeholders what was
going on operationally through the response.
2 To be as open, available, accessible, and cooperative with the media
as possible.
3 To constantly stay in the modality of trying to be proactive.
This conceptual plan meshes with and matches the positions of the
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other PIOs’ responses to the question of what constituted a communi
cation plan. However, the problem remains that the plan was neither
official, nor was it written in a way that was accessible to all JIC
members.
Additionally, the PIOs were proactive in communicating with local
stakeholders about possible worst-case scenarios. They had meetings
with local officials to discuss response plans in case, for example, “there
was a hurricane during the response. We hope it won’t happen, but if it
does this is what you should do” (Kelly, BP). The PIOs helped build
contingency plans for weather-related and other types of “worst-case
scenarios.”
In addition to each of these themes that helped to answer the RQs, a
meta-theme developed which touched on each of the four RQs and built
support for the use of the discourse of renewal as a normative crisis
communication theory. Every PIO indicated that they, as well as the
organizations they worked for, needed to expend time, energy, and
money on effective crisis communication training. This is indicative of
learning, as through the response they discovered what they did not
know. It also indicates both ethical communication and organizational
rhetoric, as these leaders were open about their need for communication
training and their desire to understand high communication standards to
help them lead more effectively. Finally, it draws on prospective vision,
as they are planning for future crises.
Each of these themes arose through analyzing the interviews with
PIOs. In the following section we use the discourse of renewal to better
understand the data.

Integrity, honesty, timeliness. I told [the JIC members], it’s not my
job to make you look good. It’s my job to let the public know if
something has gone wrong. We will do our job to fix it, but it’s never
my job to make you look good. (Sam, Coast Guard)
Multiple PIOs working for BP reported adopting the Coast Guard
values stance and maxims in directing their own communication efforts,
pointing to the Coast Guard’s “maximum disclosure, minimum delay”
axiom without prompting – suggesting that this axiom is something the
BP PIOs internalized during their time working with the Coast Guard
PIOs.
While there were successes in the area of vicarious learning and
learning from failures, a major challenge for the JIC was developing or
maintaining organizational memory. Because there was such a high rate
of “people rotation and turnover” (William, BP) in the JIC, a portion of
the work each week (if not each day) was training or re-training
personnel who had just joined the JIC or who had rotated out of the
JIC and come back onboard. Some people worked in “two week on, two
week off rotations” (Vernon, BP) in the JIC. Other people worked for
four days, and were then off for three days. The time that it took to train
new JIC members or to bring returning members up to speed reduced the
efficiency and overall organizational memory of the JIC. This turnover
contributed to the reactive nature of the communication that PIOs
experienced in the JIC.
One failure that each PIO mentioned that they wanted to learn from
was to be more proactive in their crisis communication. Due to the
barrage of communication inquiries and lack of adequate crisis plan
ning, the PIOs reported being stuck in a reactive stance during the crisis.
This was a challenge mentioned by every PIO we interviewed – and is
something that many cited as a great failure in how the JIC engaged with
stakeholders. Pat (PIO for BP) characterized the reactiveness in this way:

6. Discussion
The following section examines the relationship between the PIOs’
self-reported crisis communication experiences and the four aspects of
the discourse of renewal framework. Using the theoretical framework,
we consider aspects of the PIOs’ crisis communication that were effec
tive, as well as those that can be learned from in future responses.
Before unpacking the themes, one surprising dimension was the way
that the Coast Guard PIOs reported feeling as though they needed to be
on the defensive with the public and members of the media. As one PIO
explained (Sam, Coast Guard:

[We attempted] to go from purely reactive JIC to one that was
actually getting ahead or being proactive. We decided to be much
more active in going into the community and sharing our messages
before they were being asked, and it was very important that we had
quick media monitoring, so it was very rigorous, and that was one of
the issues is that we let things go too long without a response in the
beginning, so I think yeah we became more strategic in that sense
and became more proactive. I wish we had started that earlier.

I hate to say it, but the Coast Guard is kind of spoiled, we’re used to
being the golden child. Look at Katrina, our last big response, we
were the golden child. So all of a sudden to be taking a hammering
and getting yelled at, people were getting worn out. Burning out
really fast.

This aligns with one of Choi’s (2012) findings that messaging from
BP during the response was consistently reactive. Each of the PIOs
described efforts they made to shift their practices and communication
to move from reacting to events toward a stance of proactivity. PIOs in
future responses would benefit from internalizing the lessons found
here, as a proactive stance and engagement is vital to building trust with
stakeholders and working toward renewal.
JIC members also reported unlearning during their crisis communi
cation activities. As one PIO pointed out, “There was a greater demand
for information than there was capacity to get it out the door” (Terry,
Coast Guard). To attempt to manage information flow more effectively,
the JIC began hosting open houses for both the media and for local
leaders. These gatherings were filled with locals who were anxious
about their communities, homes, and livelihoods. Before long, these
meetings were characterized by attacks on whoever happened to be
speaking at the time. When the JIC members realized that the open
houses were ineffective and became “government bashing” or “BP
bashing” events, they changed methods. They began holding “infor
mation expo” type meetings in which people could sit down, share, and
exchange information with PIOs, SMEs, the media, and other stake
holders in a less formal context. These meetings involved no formal
agenda. Rather, they were designed to provide an open exchange of
ideas between the public and UC. For this reason, information expos
included information tables and poster board exhibits attended by
knowledgeable SMEs, PIOs, along with UC representatives. Before long,
community members, locals, and participants in these events began to

This is surprising in part because unlike BP, the Coast Guard had
done nothing wrong and was not responsible for the disaster in any way.
As mentioned previously, local stakeholders concerned for their lives
and livelihoods would lash out at or begin “bashing” PIOs and spokes
persons from both the Coast Guard and BP. This dynamic led to one of
the core demonstrations of organizational learning the JIC members
engaged in over the course of the response.
6.1. Organizational learning
According to the discourse of renewal, the four major areas of
organizational learning are vicarious learning, organizational memory,
learning from failure, and unlearning (Ulmer et al., 2019). Vicarious
learning was evident within the JIC. Those JIC members that had
received prior crisis communication training reported drawing upon
their training throughout the crisis. One training lesson many PIOs
found particularly important was to communicate “openly and trans
parently” as much as was possible. Not only did PIOs and JIC members
draw on past experiences, they reported learning from one another and
building on the successes of other JIC members. One of the Coast Guard
PIOs set the tone for the response with the value position of:
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feel as though they were heard and were able to get information that
they had felt was not accessible in the previous open house format.
Lastly, a major area where each PIO indicated a failure to unlearn
ineffective practices was in how they took care of themselves. As has
been extensively explored and discussed in academic research and in
guidance from entities such as FEMA and the CDC, emergency re
sponders regularly face burnout from overwork, exhaustion, and an
inability (or occasionally a refusal) to stop working and take time to rest
(see, for example, Benedek, Fullerton, & Ursano, 2007; Burnett & Wahl,
2015; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, n.d.; & Pietrantoni &
Prati, 2008). This dynamic was highly prevalent in the way that PIOs
and other JIC members approached their work and communication
behaviors. In hindsight, PIOs noted the problematic ways in which they
would take on a greater burden than they should have – both in the work
they were doing and in the hours they worked each shift. This aspect of
the response is something that PIOs and responders should learn from in
future responses. An aspect of training for this type of event should be
instructive and guide how to best manage a massive, never-ending
workload while also protecting the time, energy, and mental health of
the individuals conducting the communication operations.

reporters were taking days to respond to rather than hours. The PIO in
charge connected with a local reporter who was frustrated with delays in
information:
He called and said, “What’s going on, you usually answer right away,
what’s going on?” I was honest w/ him. I said look, I have the
answer, I just have to clear it. I can’t have it show up in the paper
tomorrow and have my boss ask, “Why didn’t you tell me this was
coming?” So I was honest about fact that it was taking me longer. I
admitted that fault, apologized, and by being upfront and honest it
helped a lot. (Sam, Coast Guard)
This delay in messaging meant that, in the area of engaging with the
media, there was a lack of significant choice. Significant choice is the
idea that people must be given “the best information possible under the
circumstances” (Nilsen, 1974, p. 46). Although messages were ulti
mately released, PIOs occasionally reported delays between receiving
information and providing it to crisis stakeholders. More expedient crisis
messaging increases significant choice for stakeholders and helps with
their understanding of the crisis response and recovery operations.
Developing and maintaining close stakeholder relationships is vital
to any crisis response. The discourse of renewal suggests that organi
zations should work before a crisis occurs to develop close relationships
with stakeholders. This was possible with some of the PIOs, as they
already had local connections and relationships to draw on (as with the
example of the reporter in the previous section). In other instances, this
required taking time to build trust over time by demonstrating consis
tency in messaging and delivering on promises. The PIOs reported that
over time they were able to develop relationships with various stake
holders. Local stakeholders were brought into the UC so that they could
see the response effort firsthand. Establishing the information expo
sessions was another method that the PIOs used to develop relationships
with stakeholders. Even though most of the PIOs could not rely on
previously established relationships with stakeholders, they did report
establishing relationships over time that resulted in a more effective
response.
Perhaps the most interesting evidence of ethical communication in
this response, which is also closely tied to the dynamics of organiza
tional rhetoric, is the influence that the Coast Guard had on the nature of
communication coming from the BP PIOs. The BP PIOs each indicated
that they felt quite reactive on entering the JIC, and that they had to take
time to figure out the values stance that drove their communication. The
Coast Guard PIOs, on the other hand, were able to immediately point to
the axioms and values positions that were driving their communication
from the beginning of the response. This aligns directly with Ulmer
et al.’s (2019) argument that crises do not build character, but rather
reveal the existing character in an organization. What is important here,
and we believe is directly tied to the nature of the relationships in the
JIC, is that all but one of the BP PIOs indicated learning from and
adopting the guiding ethical principles and values of the Coast Guard
PIOs. If the JIC had been split and the two sets of PIOs had not been
working together, or if the Coast Guard PIOs had not been so committed
to upholding these values, this dynamic certainly would not have been
present. Furthermore, we speculate that without the grounding ethical
foundation of the Coast Guard PIOs’ values, the nature of these data and
the responses of the two groups of PIOs would have been quite different.
Despite the conflict and challenges the two groups faced and had to
overcome, the boundaries provided by the Coast Guard PIOs’ values
shaped the communication and outcomes of the local and regional
response in positive ways.

6.2. Ethical communication
Ethical communication is an important component of crisis
communication. According to the discourse of renewal, the key concepts
of ethical communication are organizational values, significant choice,
and the importance of developing positive stakeholder relationships.
As it relates to organizational values, the PIOs in Houma reported
maintaining the values of “honesty, integrity, and timeliness” in their
crisis communication. The PIOs and other JIC members reported the
importance of honesty and integrity in providing access to crisis infor
mation to all stakeholders. For instance, the previously-mentioned open
houses were developed to have all stakeholder questions answered. This
aligns well with Choi’s (2012) finding that BP made ongoing efforts to
connect and work with local leaders on planning, preparation, and
contingencies. They also allowed officials and members of the media to
tour the command center and see the response operations firsthand. It
was not uncommon to also have members of the general public meet
with SMEs and other UC representatives to have their questions about
the response and recovery operations answered. It also seems that, at
least in some instances, the enacted values of the PIOs in Houma were
out of sync with the broader values of BP at a national or international
level. For example, the PIOs recounted several stories that suggest they
were genuinely committed to working with and helping local pop
ulations prepare for and recover from the crisis. They also openly
acknowledged the severe risks associated with the possible damage that
both the oil and the chemical dispersants could cause along the coast and
further inland in the event of a hurricane during the cleanup period.
These reports stand in stark contrast to the values and communication
that came from the broader organization earlier in the crisis. For
example, as mentioned earlier in this manuscript, then-CEO Hayward
demonstrated his own self-centered motivations and values with his
insensitive commentary about wanting to “get his life back.” The reports
of the PIOs also stand in contrast to the web visuals and advertising
campaigns that BP ran which displayed clean, open beaches at a time
when the cleanup and response efforts were still in full swing. These
examples highlight a level of ethical communication present in the local
response in Houma that was simply not evident in the broader national
and international communication efforts, per the findings of other
studies (see, for example, Kassinis & Panayiotou, 2018).
While there was a clear demonstration of ethical communication in
the nature of PIOs’ engagement with local leaders, the PIOs reported the
most difficult value to uphold was the value of timeliness of messaging.
Many reported that the JIC’s inability to be proactive during its crisis
communication was an impediment to achieving timeliness. One
example of this is at one point in the response, information requests from

6.2.1. The ethical elephant in the room
As has been broadly discussed and explored, much of BP’s response
at the national and international scale as described in the extant liter
ature ranged from moderately unethical to outrageous lies and decep
tion (Kim, 2015; Veil, Sellnow, & Wickline, 2013; Verschoor, 2010).
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However, we stand by our assessment of this microcosm of the broader
response in arguing that many aspects of the response in Houma were
marked by ethical communication and a commitment to hold to orga
nizational values. Kim (2015) offers a careful assessment of the ethics of
BP’s communication based on a review of others’ findings and news
reporting during the event. Kim’s (2015) assessment employs the TTR
model of communication ethics – Transparency, Two-way communica
tion, and Right time.
Kim found that BP violated all three of the measures for ethics – the
organization was not transparent and employed unnecessary ambiguity
in its communication. In contrast to that, the PIOs in Houma reported
ongoing efforts to increase transparency, draw in external stakeholders,
and increase information flow. Our data point to a reasonable amount of
transparency based upon the self-report data of the PIOs directly
engaged in the response in Houma, particularly compared to the broader
organization’s communication.
Secondly, Kim found that BP did not engage in two-way communi
cation. In Houma, however, PIOs brought in local leaders and journalists
to speak with responders and subject matter experts involved in the
response. On this measure as well, based upon the experiences of those
directly involved, the response in Houma appears to have been much
more ethical and consistent with two-way communication than is
described by Kim and viewed in the broader communication by BP.
Lastly, the question of Right time – how timely was the communi
cation during the response? Kim found that BP delayed and remained
silent with audiences across multiple channels. In Houma, while each
PIO indicated a range of efforts to stay connected to stakeholders, they
each reported failures in the timeliness of their communication. There
fore, on the measure of Right time, the response in Houma seems to have
matched with the broader BP response – if for different reasons.
Therefore, we argue that the response in Houma was a much more
effective and ethical than was seen by the broader BP response. This is
almost certainly attributable, in large part, to the dynamics of keeping
BP and the Coast Guard PIOs together and working as part of a unified
JIC.

less effective in managing communication challenges. Their proximity
enabled them to tackle challenges together.
The JIC did not have a clear plan to follow for the duration of the
response. More than one PIO mentioned that they did not follow the ICS
guidelines for the response and reported that there was no internal or
external communication plan. Internally there were difficulties in
messaging within the hierarchy, and the JIC in Houma felt like their
requests were never answered by UAC in New Orleans. Even if UAC had
received what they needed, Houma was left without confirmation.
Externally, the data illustrates that the JIC had no plan in place to
manage communication, which left the JIC in a reactive stance. This
reactive stance did not enable PIOs the opportunity to motivate external
stakeholders or create a reality of growth and renewal as effectively as
might have been possible.
6.4. Prospective vision
According to the discourse of renewal theory, the fourth and final
part of achieving renewal is maintaining prospective rather than retro
spective vision. During a crisis response, it is important for leaders to
communicate optimistically, to focus on the future, and to work toward
renewal rather than trying to place blame. One major issue that
inhibited the efforts of PIOs and other JIC members to maintain pro
spective vision was the lack of a substantial communication plan for
being proactive and developing a prospective vision for the response. As
mentioned previously, Kelly (PIO for BP) stated “there was no commu
nication plan in place when I arrived;” they went on to estimate that
“between 60–80 % of our time was spent being reactive.” The JIC was
largely unable to be proactive in getting messages out about the
response before new events would take place. According to the discourse
of renewal, the concept of prospective vision is about maintaining focus
on the future (Ulmer et al., 2019). Without established plans, guidelines,
or a general philosophy for communication during a crisis, organizations
remain largely reactive. If an organization cannot shift to a proactive
stance, then prospective vision cannot be achieved.
Although there were challenges to maintaining focus on the future,
the PIOs reported communicating with optimism and looked to renewal
rather than trying to place blame. The data indicate that during the
response PIOs communicated with local officials with realistic opti
mism. They acknowledged the potential for long-term damage in the
gulf as a result of the oil spill, but showed members of local communities
exactly how they were planning and preparing so that the environ
mental impact could be minimized. They also discussed the potential
damage that could result if a hurricane moved through the area before
the cleanup was complete. As one PIO reflected on the question of
planning and dealing with “what if” questions:

6.3. Effective organizational rhetoric
According to the discourse of renewal theory, effective organiza
tional rhetoric refers to the responsibility of leaders to communicate
effectively both internally to the JIC structure, and externally to their
publics during a crisis. During the response, PIOs reported not
communicating well about the need for internal stakeholders to rest.
Shifts in the command center were supposed to change every 12 h, yet
for most of the response people were working 16− 18 h shifts. The PIOs
failed to communicate to other JIC members the importance of taking
time to leave the JIC and rest so that they could come back rejuvenated.
Because PIOs did not communicate internally about their need for rest,
or externally about their need for help, JIC members often worked with
less sleep than they needed and more work than they could handle. In
this case, the PIOs reported clearly having failed in maintaining effective
organizational rhetoric. PIOs and JIC leaders in future responses would
benefit from recognizing the important value in this hindsight admission
– despite their own belief, at the time, that they were indispensable, each
PIO indicated that it was neither wise nor beneficial to continue
attempting to engage as JIC participants beyond the expected timeline of
their respective shifts.
Although there were challenges to communication within the JIC,
there were also examples of internal coordination. The data suggest that
the PIOs in Houma were able to communicate a “one-team” mentality
that helped them work together rather than separately. In Houma, the
Coast Guard and BP remained together in one JIC. All of the PIOs re
ported that despite the potentially contentious nature of their relation
ship, everyone “basically left politics at the door” and “at the end of the
day we were on the same team working for the same goals” (Pat, BP).
Had the JIC in Houma been split, it is likely that they would have been

[We responded] quite directly, “What if we have a hurricane and it
moves all the oil on shore? What are you going to do about it?” Well,
here’s the plan. “What if we have a hurricane, what are you going to
do with your ships?” A lot of that we were trying to manage by
having a plan for it, we were trying to understand what the different
scenarios were and how that would impact our operations and public
safety, and we were putting plans in place to deal with [contin
gencies] before they ever happened. (Kelly, BP)
The JIC members created contingency plans for the worst-case sce
narios so that they could be prepared to manage further crises.
Without question, there were failures in the local-level response ef
forts of the PIOs in Houma. While the communication efforts were by no
means perfect, the converging responses of both BP and CG PIOs offer a
strong indication that the JIC members made genuine efforts at trans
parent, ethical communication that is in-line with the guidelines of the
discourse of renewal. These findings stand in contrast to the findings of
related work about other aspects of this disaster by Kassinis and Pan
ayiotou (2018) or Smithson and Venette (2013).
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This section addressed the self-reported crisis communication expe
riences of the PIOs during the response. The following section consists of
three implications for PIOs, organizations, and other responders in
future large-scale crisis responses.

by building communication skills through learning, developing strong
positive crisis communication values and goals surrounding areas of
risk, and developing strong positive stakeholder relationships.
7.2. A normative theory for understanding crisis organizing processes and
responses

7. Implications for crisis communication
This study examined the unprecedented response by crisis commu
nicators charged to respond to the largest environmental disaster in
United States history. The results and discussion of this study emphasize
the importance of organizational learning, collaboration, communica
tion ethics, and proactive internal and external communication pro
cesses. This study yields three implications for crisis communication
theory and practice. The following implications focus on organizational
communication processes that can enhance future responses to largescale crises.

Although the literature in crisis communication provides a clear
understanding of how organizations currently communicate during a
crisis, we have few normative theories of crisis communication (Xu,
2018). Much of the crisis communication research focuses on failures in
communication rather than on opportunities for success or effectiveness.
The discourse of renewal is distinct in that the theory recommends or
ganizations resist the temptation to focus on image and reputation in
crisis communication. Examples such as Malden Mills, Schwan’s, Cole
Hardwoods, Odwalla, Cantor Fitzgerald, among others suggest that the
discourse of renewal provides a useful normative approach to crisis
communication theory and practice (Reierson, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2009;
Seeger & Ulmer, 2002; Seeger et al., 2005; Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer, Sellnow,
& Seeger, 2019).
This theory provides a way for researchers and practitioners to focus
on crisis communication processes over outcomes. The crisis commu
nication literature needs more normative theories of crisis communi
cation that provide clear guidance about how to communicate well
during a very difficult context. This essay illustrates how the PIOs during
the Deepwater Horizon response succeeded and failed to engage in other
parts of the discourse of renewal process. PIO reports suggested that they
succeeded by setting sound communication values, learning from their
experiences, and practicing honest and open communication.
Conversely, they report falling short of establishing a prospective vision
for the crisis response, maximizing their internal communication effec
tiveness under the UAC, and learning and preparing as thoroughly as
possible before the crisis. Future research should continue to develop
and test normative theories for effective crisis communication.

7.1. The importance of effective crisis preparation and training
The most significant implication of this essay is the importance of
crisis communication skills. Our society is routinely affected by a wide
variety of crises, from communities damaged by wildfires to livelihoods
lost to economic downturn. The literature is replete with examples of
ineffective and maladaptive responses to the difficult context of
communicating during a crisis. Individuals and organizations can
benefit from building skills in effective crisis communication. Every PIO
we interviewed reported wishing they had a crisis plan in place and
significant training in advance to aid their response capacity. Those PIOs
that had received some crisis training reported relying on that training
extensively during the event. Extensive, ongoing training and develop
ment in crisis communication is essential for high-risk organizations like
those in the oil industry. Individuals and organizations build their ca
pacity to manage a crisis by learning knowledge and skills over time.
Organizations are much better off learning vicariously from other or
ganizations pre-crisis compared to trying to learn while managing a
crisis.
However, few organizations are prepared for communicating during
a crisis. The discourse of renewal suggests that crisis planning and
training should involve understanding crisis choices between empha
sizing the threat and opportunity during a crisis, clarifying organiza
tional and crisis communication goals and values, building positive
relationships with stakeholders over time, developing conflict manage
ment and resolution strategies, and capitalizing on vicarious learning
opportunities through the examination of case studies and conducting
crisis simulations. By understanding the unique context of crisis
communication and building expertise and understanding about how to
communicate, organizations can be much more proactive and confident
in their crisis communication. However, crisis planning and training
should not just involve internal organizational stakeholders.
Building external relationships among key stakeholders is also a vital
aspect of developing an effective crisis response. Before the Oklahoma
City bombing occurred in April of 1995, Governor Keating worked to
develop relationships among various key stakeholders in areas that were
vital to the rescue and response efforts. Because relationships had
already been developed, responders were able to work together more
effectively (Reynolds et al., 2002). Aaron Feuerstein, owner of Malden
Mills also regarded stakeholder relationships as critical to his response
to a plant fire at his mill (Ulmer, 2001). Finally, Schwan’s Sales Enter
prises relied heavily on pre-established stakeholder relationships to
respond to their salmonella outbreak (Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998).
Future crisis planning in the oil industry should engage communities
about response and recovery operations including the use of dispersants,
burning, booming, and other health and human safety issues before a
crisis. Issues of how to communicate about these response and recovery
operations should be central to crisis planning. In short, organizations
that wish to communicate effectively in a crisis would do well to prepare

7.3. Correcting the threat bias in crisis communication
Finally, the discourse of renewal emphasizes mindfully considering
how we define crises. Crises are routinely characterized by surprise,
threat, and short response time, or as “low probability/high conse
quence events that threaten the most fundamental goals of an organi
zation” (Weick, 1988, p. 305). These definitions have been central to the
research and practice of crisis communication for the past 50 years.
Much of the focus on threat in the crisis communication literature em
phasizes threat to the image of the organization. We argue that how we
symbolically define crisis has an impact on how we act in a crisis. For
this reason, we need to expand definitions of crisis to include both threat
and opportunity to the fundamental goals of the organization. In this
case, the crisis communication practitioner should be aware of the
consequences of focusing on the threat or the opportunities associated
with the crisis.
Consider if the PIOs involved in BP’s crisis communication in the
Gulf of Mexico emphasized protecting the image of the company over
opportunities to provide information to stakeholders about response and
recovery operations. For BP and Unified Command to focus on threat to
its reputation or on itself in any way would have been counterproductive
and would have intensified the crisis for itself and its stakeholders as we
saw with the initial ill received responses by CEO Tony Hayward (Lubin,
2010a, June 2). Any persuasion used unethically to shift blame away
from BP or to minimize the crisis would have certainly made the crisis
worse for all involved. Conversely, using the crisis as an opportunity to
provide open and honest communication to stakeholders about the
crisis, communication regarding lessons learned, and a prospective
vision for moving the organization forward are useful and productive
approaches to crisis communication. These normative crisis communi
cation processes, described in the discourse of renewal, are essential to
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improving crisis communication practice. However, organizations that
fail to see the opportunities in defining crises and focus excessively on
the threat of the crisis are likely to leave these opportunities dormant
and hidden from view.
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8. Conclusion
Public Information Officers have the difficult task of coordinating
communication among many disparate groups during a complex and
difficult crisis situation. They must ensure stakeholders, the public, the
media, and crisis management personnel are all able to remain updated
and connected during a crisis. The purpose of this paper was to analyze
the communication experiences of PIOs during the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill response in order to develop implications for PIOs in future
responses. The PIOs had an incredibly challenging task, and our research
revealed both successes and failures in their reported communication
during the response. While the global response was marked by failure
and frustration, we found many areas of effective and successful
communication in the local and regional response. Future research
should continue to address the effectiveness of PIO crisis communication
practices. This study provided an excellent opportunity to learn and
prepare for the next crisis event. Ultimately, crises are going to continue
to happen. Organizations and PIOs must be trained in crisis communi
cation theory and practice. PIOs need a strong foundation of theory to
guide their communication practice and to ensure they are properly
equipped to manage crises effectively.
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